Socrates argues that one shouldn't fear death because it is actually a blessing. His premises for this conclusion are as follows. First of all, either death is nothingness or a relocation of the soul. If death is nothingness, then it is a blessing. If death is a relocation of the soul, then it is a blessing. Therefore death is a blessing (Plato's Apology (1981) 40c-41c.) In examining this argument, it is valid because the premises do entail the conclusion. Socrates doesn't have to argue that death is nothingness or relocation. He simply had to show that if death is one or the other, it is a blessing.

In order for this argument to be sound, however, the premises need to be true. The first premise immediately comes in to question because it appears to be a false dilemma. Socrates is asserting in his argument that there are only two avenues death might take, when in fact there could be other possibilities. For instance, couldn't death be an eternity of staring at the inside of a coffin six feet under (because your soul wasn't lucky enough to get relocated) as you are slowly eaten away by bugs and such? That might not be considered a blessing by some. Socrates doesn't seem to address this issue, but he does provide further support for his second and third premises.

Socrates argues that if death is nothingness or a lack of perception, it can be likened to a dreamless sleep. Everyone enjoys a dreamless sleep because one wakes up refreshed. Therefore, since a dreamless sleep is so pleasant, it could be considered a blessing. Socrates argues that nothingness is like a dreamless sleep because they are both a lack of perception, so one can conclude that death is a blessing because "all eternity would then seem to be no more than a single night" (Apology (1981) 40e.)

One might argue that Socrates can't assume that a dreamless sleep is counted among the most pleasurable of nights and days. I think that Socrates would reply that this is a reasonable assumption since, at times other than dreamless sleep, our body is carrying various perceptions of the senses for the mind to sort out. A lack of perception in which the mind is not inundated with so many messages could certainly be counted a great pleasure. Shakespeare's Hamlet would argue that in fact death is a sleep full of dreams. "For in that sleep of death what dreams may come when we have shuffled off this mortal coil, must give us pause" (Shakespeare (1970) Scene 3, act 1, line 66-68.) Hamlet sees a never-ending sleep full of dreams as extremely pleasant, but these very dreams are the "undiscovered country" which makes him fear death (Shakespeare (1970) Scene 3, act 1, line 79.) Socrates would then say that although, this might be another possibility for what death could be, it is a straw man argument that really doesn't address the issue of whether or not death is a blessing if it is nothingness. Hamlet hasn't attacked whether or not a dreamless sleep could be considered a blessing. He's simply gone off on a tangent.

Socrates also gave further support for death being a blessing if it is a relocation of the soul. He would get to see all of the greats such as Homer and Achilles because he assumes that they would be in this new place as well (Apology (1981) 41b.) Seeing such great people would be a blessing for Socrates because it would give him a chance to carry out the elenchus and put their wisdom to the question. Socrates also believes that he would find just judges, unlike his judicial experience in the world of the living. He argues that this makes relocation a blessing because these just judges would give him a proper trial (and of course see that he is innocent of all charges.) Socrates sees the only true judges residing in the afterlife because the judges of the real world are biased against him (Apology (1981) 41a.) Therefore, because Socrates gets to carry out his elenchus with the greats and have a proper trial with just judges, he sees a relocation of death as being a blessing.

This particular subargument raises several objections. First of all, what if the soul relocates somewhere unpleasant? Socrates would argue that this isn't possible because everyone would go to Hades when they died (unless they were elevated to divine status) and would then of course bump into the greats and the just judges. However, in reality Hades was actually a pretty awful place, at least according to Homer, as it was very dark and gloomy with mere shadows of people flitting about. Socrates would probably argue that those are minor discomforts that would be mitigated in meeting Homer and Achilles, but what is pleasant to Socrates might not be pleasant for others.

One could also argue that the unjust aren't going to be relocated to the same wonderful place as just people. If so, isn't Socrates assuming that he's led a just and good life? Socrates would reply that he thinks he has led a good life through carrying out the elenchus to guide people onto the path admitting what they don't know. He would also say that people who lead a good life in trying to better their soul need not fear if death is relocation because they will be with other just souls.

[Note: this paper is posted on the internet, at http://cda.morris.umn.edu/~okeefets/death-paper.html. It is the work of a student at the University of Minnesota, Morris!]

Another objection that arises is that death wouldn't be a blessing if one has to leave a perfectly enjoyable life. A person who is bettering their soul and enjoying the simple pleasures that the world has to offer would not view death as a blessing because it would take them away from the life they have made for themselves. Socrates would argue that death could still be considered a blessing even if one is leading a perfectly enjoyable life because death would just be a continuation of a good thing. After all, he believes that if one has led this good life, then they wouldn't have anything to fear in death and could look forward to it as this blessing.

Another assumption that Socrates makes in his sub-argument for death being a blessing, if it is a form of relocation, is that he will find just judges there. He gives no support for believing he will find justice in Hades. For all he knows, the judges there might have already heard of his reputation from other Athenian souls and become prejudiced. This assumption is problematic because he doesn't define what he considers justice to be.

Although Socrates makes a valid argument with interesting premises that death is a blessing, therefore not to be feared, he makes too many assumptions for one to rationally accept his argument as sound. Epicurus would definitely argue with Socrates as to whether or not Socrates could claim that death is a relocation of the soul since Epicurus sees death as a form of annihilation.

While Socrates assumed that one would understand his definition of lack of perception for arguing death as nothingness, Epicurus elaborates more fully on this concept in his "no subject of harm" argument (Epicurus (1994) Text 4, sect. 125.) He doesn't believe people should fear death because in death one just simply ceases to exist. Epicurus argues that death does not affect the living because, since death is annihilation, it has no effect on the living, as they have not yet been annihilated. So, because death has no effect on the living, it's not a bad thing for the living. In order for something to be bad for somebody, that person has to exist at least; however, the dead don't exist. Therefore it follows that death is not bad for the dead. Therefore, we now know that death is bad for neither the living nor the dead. Epicurus' argument is valid because his conclusion logically follows from the premises presented.

[Note: this paper is posted on the internet, at http://cda.morris.umn.edu/~okeefets/death-paper.html. It is the work of a student at the University of Minnesota, Morris!]

The only premise that really needs to be supported in order to be true is Epicurus' assumption that death is an annihilation. He assumes this from his argument that the universe is made up of only atoms and void. Since everything can be explained in terms of atoms and void, he states that the mind (soul) is a bodily thing. Since it is a bodily thing, the mind ceases to exist when the body dies. Therefore, death is annihilation because one no longer exists. The atoms simply disperse back into the void. Without arguing as to whether or not one can consider the mind a bodily thing, this concept lays grounds for Epicurus' assumption that death is annihilation. Based upon these grounds, his argument can also be considered a sound argument.

One might argue that one should still fear death because it will be painful. Epicurus refutes this by stating that one has to have awareness in order to feel pleasure or pain. Therefore, because death is nothing or an absence of awareness, death is neither pleasurable nor painful (Epicurus (1994) Text 4, Sect. 124.) This statement would refute Socrates' proposal that death, as a dreamless sleep, would be pleasurable. Epicurus would argue with Socrates that because he considers dreamless sleep a lack of perception, it could be neither pleasurable, nor painful. Epicurus would also argue that Socrates' analogy of death, as nothingness, to a dreamless sleep is not effective. A dreamless sleep carries the implication that one is going to wake up. Waking up from the dreamless sleep brings the pleasure, but one wouldn't wake up from death. Epicurus says that once a person dies, that is it. So not only does a dreamless sleep not bring pleasure because it is a lack of awareness, but death as a dreamless sleep wouldn't be a pleasurable experience because one would not wake up from this death to enjoy the effects of the sleep. However, this still does not change the fact that death, as a lack of perception shouldn't be feared.

One could argue that death will deprive a person of the goods of life, causing the person mental anguish because they won't be able to enjoy their McDonalds Egg McMuffins after they die. What about those darn Egg McMuffins, says Epicurus. Since death is annihilation, Egg McMuffins aren't going to matter anyway because one won't be able to enjoy them since the person will no longer exist. Besides that, if one is leading the simple life Epicurus promotes (that wouldn't include obsessing about silly things like Egg McMuffins,) the prospect of not being able to enjoy them anymore shouldn't worry the person as they are non-necessary goods.

Someone might also ask about the prospect of death causing pain. Epicurus would ignore this as nonsense! If death doesn't cause any pain, then to allow the prospect of it to cause one pain now is just irrational. Lucretius provides proof of this point in his "symmetry" argument. "Look back at time-How meaningless, how unreal!-before our birth. In this way Nature holds before our eyes the mirror of our future after death. Is this so grim, so gloomy? Is it not a rest more free from care than any sleep?" (Lucretius (1969) p.114) He states that anyone fearing death should look at prenatal existence. Not existing before one is born isn't something that causes fear. Lucretius argues that the time before one is born is the same eternity as post-mortem eternity. Therefore, since one has no reason to fear non-existence before one is born, not existing after death shouldn't cause fear either.

By arguing that death is annihilation, Epicurus effectively combats the fear presented against Socrates' argument about having a bad afterlife. Because the mind is atoms, one just ceases to exist. No worries, no cares. So what is there to fear about death? I think Epicurus has given a cogent argument that the answer is nothing. His premises entail the conclusion, they are logical and appear sound to me, and he makes his argument very convincingly, especially against possible objections.

I would have to agree with Epicurus. As of today, many scientific findings would back up his argument that we cease to exist when we die. For instance, atoms do exist and everything can be explained in terms of atoms. One can even explain the mind in terms of atoms because the mind communicates with the body through various nerve impulses in the brain sent to the appropriate points in the body. One objection to this would be that the mind is an immaterial thing and can't be connected to the body. I would argue that the mind CAN be connected. For instance, look at what happens when an elderly person suffers from Alzheimer's. They can no longer remember parts of their life, even basic tasks that they were just assigned shortly beforehand, depending on the severity of the disease. This bodily disease has affected the mind because an important part of the person's sense of self can no longer be readily accessed. Therefore, the mind must be bodily if a bodily disease affects it. Other examples to support a connection between the mind and body would be lobotomies, Parkinson's, or even an accident that causes some sort of brain damage. Another example that death is annihilation is a human vegetable. A person's brain has been so severely damaged that they no longer function or even have any brain waves. The mind's connection has been lost. One could refute this argument by pointing out people who are in a coma and wake up from it. (I can't argue against this too well because my specific knowledge of the medical aspect is rather shady except to say that I believe that someone in a coma still has brainwaves.)

Another argument that Socrates might pose against Epicurus and myself is that we haven't considered the possibility of an afterlife. First of all, Socrates' argument for death being a blessing if it were a relocation of the soul was full of assumptions that he didn't back up, but now I am making an ad huminem attack rather than addressing the issue at hand.... I would argue that there no evidence of an afterlife. In order to prove that there is life after death, I would need direct testimony from someone about the afterlife, but that isn't possible since I can't hear from the dead. Another way to refute my argument against an afterlife is to mention that there are holy scriptures written by God about the afterlife. My quickest response is that I don't know how reliable these scriptures are. I have no proof that they are written by God. For all I know, they could be written by a man in a drunken stupor just to appease the masses. Therefore, I know that death is annihilation because no afterlife exists. As Epicurus points out, if everything can be explained in terms of atom and void, the soul is a material thing that ceases to exist when the body dies. So I don't fear death since I will just simply cease to exist.

Being able to live life without fear of death would vastly improve people's dispositions. I think we all should take a cue from Epicurus' argument and seize the day, rather than wasting our time on irrational fears.

WORKS CITED

Epicurus. The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994. Translated and Edited by Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson.

Lucretius. The Way Things Are. Indiana University Press, 1969. Translated by Rolfe Humphries.

Plato. The Apology. Hackett Publishing Company, 1981. Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

Shakespeare, William. Hamlet Prince of Denmark. Penguin books, 1970. Edited by Willard Farnham.